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1— Abstract —
Innovations in the mortgage market since the mid-1990s have eﬀectively reduced a number of
ﬁnancing constraints. Coinciding with these innovations, we document a signiﬁcant change
in the propensity for households to own their homes, as well as substantial increases in the
share of household income devoted to housing. These changes in housing expenditures are
especially large for those groups that faced the greatest ﬁnancial constraints, and are robust
across the changing composition of households and their geographic location. We present
evidence that young, constrained households may have used newly designed mortgages to
ﬁnance their increased expenditures on housing.
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Financing constraints hinder the smoothing of housing and non-housing consumption. How-
ever, relative to the early 1990s, innovations in the mortgage market have eﬀectively reduced
these constraints in a variety of ways.1 For instance, the increase in the menu of mortgage
instruments allows consumers to better match housing decisions with permanent income in-
stead of current income. Also, mortgage lenders have increased their ability to measure and
price the risk of mortgage applicants, allowing, among other things, lower down payment
requirements. Finally, consumers face lower costs today for reﬁnancing existing mortgages
and extracting home equity, eﬀectively increasing the liquidity of their homes. Coinciding
with these developments in the mortgage market has been a marked increase in the demand
for owner-occupied housing, as witnessed by a sharp increase in the homeownership rate and
also in the share of income devoted to housing consumption.
Innovations in the mortgage market and the increase in demand for housing are likely
linked. To explore this linkage, we model the consumer’s housing consumption problem
in the face of several ﬁnancing constraints. As the ﬁnancing constraints are relaxed by
innovations in the mortgage market, households enjoy higher utility and optimally choose
to increase the share of income devoted to housing. Coupled to these models, our empirical
strategy examines the timing of the house purchase decision (the extensive margin) and
also on the share of income devoted to housing by homeowners (the intensive margin). In
1terms of the house purchase decision, the homeownership rate witnessed a remarkable 5
percentage point increase between 1994 and 2004 after being relatively stable for several
decades. The homeownership rate increased sharply for young households, especially for
households with relatively high educational attainment; it is these households that have the
greatest discrepancy between current income and permanent income, and therefore it is these
households that would beneﬁt greatly from innovations in mortgage markets.
On the intensive margin, owner-occupied households have increased the share of their
income devoted to housing by several percentage points from 1997 to 2005. We document
that lower income households increased their spending on housing more sharply than did
higher income households, consistent with the view that higher income households faced less
binding ﬁnancing constraints. To address a competing hypothesis that households increased
their share of income going to housing because housing became a more attractive asset,
we examine how spending varied between markets diﬀerentiated by observed house price
appreciation. We ﬁnd that spending on housing as a share of income increased markedly in
virtually all markets, regardless of what happened to house prices in those markets. Insofar
as alternative mortgage products may have increased the potential for housing consumption
smoothing, we ﬁnd that young and educated households have chosen mortgage products
with relatively low mortgage interest rates.
This paper builds upon a growing literature on the evolution of ﬁnancial constraints
2in housing markets and their eﬀects on the consumption of housing, housing prices, and
the consumption and prices of other goods and assets in the economy. The paper that is
perhaps the most similar to ours is Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2006); in that paper, the
authors argue that homeowners have improved their ability to better match their future
income with house prices, and the reason for this better matching is because of innovations
in mortgages. Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2005) also examine the changes in the
home ownership rate via a dynamic general equilibrium model. They argue, like us, that
mortgage market innovations are a quantitatively important part of the explanation for the
rise in the homeownership rate in the 1990s.2 Our paper diﬀers from these two papers in
that we examine empirically how demand for housing has increased at the time that these
mortgage market innovations have taken place. We identify the demographic groups whose
behavior has changed the most, while presenting some preliminary evidence on the way these
changes in housing consumption were ﬁnanced.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief summary of develop-
ments in the mortgage market that have reduced the constraints faced by home buyers and
owners. Section 3 outlines a household’s consumption/housing consumption problem to mo-
tivate the main empirical predictions of mortgage market innovation for consumer behavior.
Section 4 presents a series of empirical results from a wide variety of datasets that support
the implications of the model and Section 5 concludes.
32 Innovations in the mortgage industry
Since the mid-1990s, the most profound changes in the mortgage market appear to have
stemmed from improvements in the ability of mortgage issuers to gather and process infor-
mation. Information technology has reduced the costs incurred in the mortgage origination
process, has assisted lenders in learning about the credit quality of borrowers and the value
of collateral, and helped in oﬀering a greater array of mortgage products.
In terms of reducing the costs associated with the mortgage origination process, lenders
must share information with credit bureaus, title companies, appraisers, and insurers, among
others. Prior to the availability of easy-to-use email and fax machines, much of the data
needed to make an underwriting decision was assembled slowly as the diﬀerent parties ex-
changed information through the mail. The industry now speaks of the “paperless” mortgage
and its potential to dramatically reduce the amount of time between closing of the loan and
securitization.3 Danforth (1999) estimates that, prior to the introduction of internet-based
features to the mortgage origination process, transaction costs associated with mortgage
origination reached three percentage points of total loan value. While it is diﬃcult to ob-
tain precise mortgage lending costs for commercial banks or mortgage companies, one crude
measure suggests that labor productivity in the mortgage industry increased substantially
(about 2-1/2 times) from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. Also, the points and spreads for
1-year adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) have drifted steadily down over the past decade.4
4Statistical models designed to estimate changes in collateral value, or automated valuation
models (AVMs), have gained widespread use in the mortgage industry over the past decade.
AVMs have been particularly important for reducing the cost of reﬁnancing, as many lenders
rely heavily on the AVM for a quick estimate of the collateral value to see whether the
borrower (re)qualiﬁes for the new mortgage loan.5
Statistical models are also used to produce credit scores, and beginning in the mid-1990s,
credit scores have been used by the mortgage industry.6 Credit scoring models have led
to better risk management and have helped lenders to form better estimates of repayment
probabilities, particularly for borrowers with more opaque credit quality, like ﬁrst-time and
low-income home buyers.7 As a result, credit scoring could have helped a greater share of
the population to become eligible for a mortgage and could have also helped reduce the down
payment requirements for others.
A ﬁnal class of innovations concerns the design of the mortgage instruments themselves.
Product diﬀerentiation in the mortgage market reﬂects the great diversity of tastes and
demographics amongst borrowers, as well as the ﬁnancial conditions in the overall economy.8
Beyond the simple matching of tastes, lenders have incentive to oﬀer a menu of contracts as a
way of mitigating the adverse selection problems in the borrower pool.9 While the traditional
30-year ﬁxed rate mortgage remains a popular instrument, other less-traditional instruments
have gained market share, especially during the early 2000s.10 These instruments vary by
5interest rate charged, term, amortization and payment schedule, and diﬀer substantially
from more traditional ﬁxed-rate or even many adjustable-rate mortgages. One reason that
mortgage issuers are better able to tailor mortgage instruments to consumers is because
of thicker secondary markets and the increased ability of participants in these secondary
markets to assess the risk of mortgage-backed securities.
3 A simple model of housing consumption
This section presents a simple model that demonstrates how consumers respond to mortgage
market innovations that relax diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial constraints. The ﬁrst constraint
is the down payment requirement when purchasing a home. As shown in several surveys,
the households that are most likely to beneﬁt from the loosening of this constraint are
households with few non-housing assets, such as the young and lower income. A second
constraint households face is how much they can borrow relative to current income.11 This
constraint is particularly binding for young, college-educated households whose future income
may be much higher than current income. To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows indexes of
average wages estimated by age for diﬀerent educational attainment categories using the 2000
Decennial Census.12 A striking result from Figure 1 is the extent to which wages increase
for individuals with a college education over their 20’s and 30’s, and how current income can
be signiﬁcantly below permanent income. For individuals with only a high-school education
6or less, real incomes typically grow much more slowly over time.
To explore the way in which innovations that relax ﬁnancial constraints might be expected
to aﬀect the consumption decisions of households, we develop a two period model of a
household with preferences for a consumption good c and a housing good h. A household











Expenditures on housing consist of a down payment, expressed as a fraction, δ, of the
value of the house, h (the per-unit price of housing is set equal to 1), and mortgage payments
made in the ﬁrst and second periods, m1 and m2. These constraints can all be written as,
c1 + m1 + δh ≤ y1, (2)
c2 + m2 ≤ y2, (3)
m1 + m2 = (1 − δ)h. (4)
Equations (2) and (3) are the budget constraints for the ﬁrst and second periods, and (4)
is the solvency constraint requiring borrowers to eventually repay the loan in full.
7The household problem is to choose c1, c2, and h to maximize (1) subject to (2)-(4).
The problem is admittedly simpliﬁed, as it abstracts away from the rent-to-buy decision,
uncertainty over income or interest rates, bequests motives, and the like. However, the
problem illustrates two of the three constraints we wish to focus on. The ﬁrst is the down
payment constraint which limits the amount of the housing purchase that can be ﬁnanced.
Housing is perfectly divisible in this model, so low income households are not shut out of the
housing market. Instead, they consume small quantities of housing. If we were to specify
a minimum amount of the housing good, ¯ h that can be purchased, then the down payment
constraint can be much more important for households with initially low income. Indeed,
if prices are such that a household can not aﬀord to buy the minimum quantity ¯ h, then
reducing the down payment constraint will literally make homeownership possible.
The second constraint that the problem highlights is the timing of the repayment of the
mortgage. We consider cases where the repayment schedule is constant over time (m1 = m2),
as is the case for the standard ﬁxed-rate fully amortizing loan. Alternatively, we can allow
for payments to grow over time, m1 < m2. As stated above, this shifting of the burden
of the mortgage repayment from early in the life of the loan to the latter periods has been
one of the deﬁning characteristics of the so-called alternative mortgage products. Other
representations of the timing constraint could include, for example, a constraint on m1 not
exceeding a certain fraction of y1. These other representations yield results very similar to
8those presented below.
The model is solved numerically. In these simulations, the housing preference parameter,
(1−θ), is set to .3, slightly above the share of income that the average household devotes to
housing. The parameter γ is equal to 2; the greater the value of γ, the less easily households
can substitute consumption in one period for another. The main results are not sensitive to
to the choice of γ, so long as γ > 1.
We study two hypothetical households that diﬀer by their income growth; both house-
holds have the same income in period 1, but one household enjoys income growth of 50
percent in the second period (similar to the growth experienced by educated households
over a multi-year period), while the other household’s income grows by just 10 percent. We
examine the eﬀect of changes in the down payment constraint on the housing expenditures
made by the two households. We also consider two diﬀerent scenarios for the timing of the
mortgage repayment. In the ﬁrst, the mortgage payments are equal in both periods. In the
second scenario, the mortgage payment is allowed to grow in the spirit of some alternative
mortgage products. In this scenario, we assume that m2 = 1.5 ∗ m1.
The model’s solution includes utility, spending on consumption of the nonhousing good
(c1 and c2), and spending on housing. To better match available empirical measures, we
focus on the share of income spent on housing, and the model’s results are summarized in
Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows how the share of income spent on housing varies by income
9growth, the down payment constraint, and the alternative scenarios for the timing of the
mortgage payment. Several points emerge from the simulations. First, housing expenditures
as a share of income increase as the down payment constraint is eased from 20 percent
to 5 percent, regardless of income growth or assumptions about the timing of the mortgage
payments. Second, the slope of these expenditure functions is greater for high income growth
households (dashed lines) than for households with low income growth (solid lines). Third,
shifting the burden of the mortgage repayment to the second period (when income is higher)
induces households to spend more on housing. These changes in housing expenditures are
larger for high income growth households than they are for lower income households. Indeed,
for low income growth households that have access to a mortgage that grows over time (bold
solid line), there comes a point where the down payment constraint no longer binds, and
further relaxation of the constraint does not change the housing consumption decision.
These results are based on a very simple model that examines two of the three innovations
we have emphasized. A more complex multi-period model is required to examine the eﬀects
of the third innovation–the lower costs associated with reﬁnancing and extracting equity
from the home. Such an extension yields many of the same qualitative results from the
simple two-period model. Namely, if households are allowed access to their home equity
to use as income insurance, then reducing the costs of equity extraction (making the home
equity more liquid) will have the eﬀect of making the home a more attractive asset, all else
10equal, and demand for housing will increase. The increase in the liquidity of home equity
will beneﬁt all households, and particularly those with fewer non-housing assets (such as the
young and lower income), and those with volatile income.13
4 Empirical results
The models presented in the previous section generate a diverse set of predictions. As one of
the important margins of housing adjustment from the consumer’s perspective is the rent-
to-buy margin, our ﬁrst set of results examines the change in the homeownership rate from
1994 to 2004. Then, focusing only on homeowners, we examine how the share of income
devoted to housing has increased over time. The ﬁnal set of results explores the choice of
mortgage characteristics by demographic groups.
4.1 Changes in homeownership rates
Our models illustrate how innovations in mortgage markets would increase demand for hous-
ing, and one manifestation of that increased demand would be an increase in the homeown-
ership rate.14 The homeownership rate ﬂuctuated within a tight range between 1970 and
1994. Starting in 1994, the homeownership rate began a steady rise of ﬁve percentage points
to 69 percent in 2004, and has since remained close to this elevated level. The 1994 to 2004
increase in the homeownership rate reﬂected an increase of 12 million homeowners.15
11One factor behind the increase in the homeownership rate could have been the improve-
ment in overall economic conditions, as the 1994-2004 period witnessed a period of above-
average growth. However, there are several reasons to discount the improving economy story.
First, although economic growth was strong overall during this period, there was a recession
in 2001, and despite this downturn, the homeownership rate steadily increased. Further, as
has been documented in numerous studies, gains in real income were largely conﬁned to the
upper tail of the income distribution during this time period (see Autor, Katz, and Kearney
2005), and, as we show and discuss below, the homeownership rate increased rapidly for the
low to middle income groups. Finally, looking over a longer time period (back to the 1960s),
changes in the homeownership rate do not correlate closely with economic cycles.
Another reason ownership rates could have increased is in response to demographic
change. For instance, the median age of the population has been increasing as the baby
boomers work their way up the age scale; if older people are more likely to be homeowners,
then the increase in the homeownership rate could simply reﬂect changing demographics.
Table 1 shows the change in the homeownership rate by various demographic breakdowns
for 1994 and 2004 using the Current Population Survey (CPS) outgoing rotation panel in
conjunction with the Residential Vacancy and Homeownership Survey. As discussed in other
research and shown in Table 1, homeownership rates increased between 1994 and 2004 for
nearly every demographic sub-group, but the largest increases occurred for the young and
12college-educated.
To be more precise about the role of changing demographics, we decompose the change
in the homeownership rate into the change attributable to changes in demographics and into
changes in the propensity for homeownership for each demographic group. Using the pro-
cedure proposed by Fairlie (2005) that follows the spirit of Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions,
we ﬁnd that changes in the demographic distribution between 1994 and 2004 account for
less than 20 percent of the increase in the homeownership rate. Most of the increase in the
homeownership rate is attributable to an increased propensity for homeownership by each
demographic slice of the population.
The models in section 3 are consistent with the results in Table 1 in several ways. Through
the credit scoring channel, down payment requirements would be reduced, and that would
assist the younger households that are traditionally cash constrained. Also, households with
steep expected earnings proﬁles may be able to purchase their desired home earlier by using
ﬁnancing instruments that have payments that increase over time; that is, households where
the head is college-educated. The households headed by younger people enjoyed the largest
increase in ownership; according to our models, it is this group that may have faced the
largest relaxation in borrowing constraints. Further down in Table 1 are results by age and
education. As mentioned in the model section, we examine education because the curvature
of lifetime earnings proﬁles varies tremendously by educational attainment. Within the
13younger groups (households where the head is less than 40), it is the college educated that
have increased their homeownership rates the fastest.
The results in Table 1 hold up to more formal analysis. Probit models of homeownership
were estimated with the variables presented in Table 1 (age, education, income, etc.) and
other controls include number of children, prime age adults, and seniors. The models were
estimated where all of the independent variables were interacted with year (1994 or 2004).
The number of estimated parameters is therefore large and we do not present them here.
When simultaneously controlling for a wide variety of variables, the demographic groups that
enjoyed the largest statistical increase in homeownership are those groups shown in Table 1,
namely the young and higher-educated.
4.2 Housing costs as a share of income
The models in section 3 suggest several reasons why households would increase their lifetime
expenditures on housing relative to income. We examine changes in household spending
on housing relative to income, where housing costs include mortgage payments, utilities,
property taxes, home insurance, condo fees, and other regularly occurring costs associated
with homeownership that are collected in the American Housing Survey (AHS). There are
several micro-level data sets with some measure of housing costs and income, including
the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, the Survey of Consumer Finance, the Consumer
14Expenditure Survey, and the AHS. Although each data set possesses its own advantages,
we focus on the results from the AHS because the AHS has a larger sample than the other
surveys. Also, the AHS has some geographic detail, which, as we explain further below, could
potentially be important for identiﬁcation. Finally, the AHS has a wealth of information
about the home, the demographics of its occupants, and the way the home is ﬁnanced.
We use observations from the AHS in the odd-numbered years between 1997 and 2005.
We limit the sample from 1997 onward because the data are consistent over this time and
edit ﬂags are available. To be included in the analysis, we required observations to have
reported mortgage payments, at least 50 percent of salary income not imputed, and the
households were homeowners. In the analysis, we focus on the ratio of total housing costs
to income. However, our results are robust to other measures as well, including the ratio
of total mortgage costs to income and the cost of servicing just the primary mortgage to
income.16
A visual representation of total housing cost to income is presented in Figure 3, the kernel
density over our sample period. There is a notable rightward shift from 1997 to 2005 in these
unconditional distributions. To more closely examine this rightward shift, we estimate a set
of models of the form:
hit = α + βXit + γt + it (5)
15where hit is some measure of housing cost to gross income for family i and time t, and
γ is a vector of time dummies. To ensure that the year dummy results do not arise from
changing demographics, we include control variables, X, that measure basic information
about the household, including educational attainment, the number of children, prime age
adults, and elderly in the household. Further, we include a set of ﬁve age dummies for
the head of household (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69). 17 A Tobit model is used
to estimate these equations because the dependent variable is left-censored at zero and we
impose a right-censor at 80.18
Table 2 reports results from diﬀering speciﬁcations of equation (5). In all of the models,
we include year ﬁxed eﬀects to examine the change in the ratio of housing costs to income
over time for the mean household. The ﬁrst column reports the estimates from a model
that includes only year dummies. Column 2 reports the results for year dummies and basic
demographic controls. As discussed above, the homeownership rate rose considerably during
the sample period, resulting in a potential change in sample. To control for the possibility
that the coeﬃcients on the time dummies may be inﬂuenced by the inﬂux of new homeowners,
the model reported in column 3 includes the number of years the family has been living in
the home and the number of years squared in addition to the demographic controls in column
2.19 Finally, columns 4 and 5 include dummy variables for the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) of the household; column 5 drops those observations where the MSA is not reported
16while column 4 codes those observations as their own unique MSA.
In terms of the coeﬃcients on the year dummies, all of the models show that the share
of income devoted to housing has increased several percentage points from 1997 to 2005,
and this result is robust to numerous speciﬁcations.20 In terms of the demographic controls,
we generally ﬁnd that higher educated households tend to spend a smaller share of their
income on housing, as do households with persons over the age of 60. The opposite is
true of households with more than one prime age adult. Perhaps not surprisingly, the total
housing costs-to-income ratio falls as age increases. Households whose heads are of age 60
to 70 pay about 5-7 percentage points less in mortgage payments relative to income than
households in their 20s. As a robustness check, the models were estimated separately by year
and the coeﬃcients on the demographic variables changed little over time.21 Although these
demographic controls are interesting in and of themselves, the main motivation for including
them is to ensure that the results for the time dummies do not arise from demographic
changes in the sample.
One of the main implications from the model section was that those households facing
binding ﬁnancial constraints will beneﬁt the most from ﬁnancial innovations. Applying this
logic, lower income households are more likely to face ﬁnance constraints than higher income
households. To examine how the share of income devoted to housing varies by income,
Table 3 reports models estimated separately for each income quintile.22 The two groups that
17experienced the largest increases over time are the two lowest income quintiles, where the
increase in housing expenditure share increased by approximately 3-3/4 percentage points
from 1997 to 2005. By contrast, the sample that makes up the highest income quintile
increased their share of income to housing by only 1-1/2 percentage points.
The model section also highlighted how households may beneﬁt from mortgage innova-
tions by age and educational attainment. Table 4 shows the results by age and educational
attainment; the younger members of both educational groups–those with high school or
less and those with some college or more–witnessed similar increases in the share of income
devoted to housing costs. Additionally, when the models are estimated by income quin-
tile interacted with educational attainment (not shown), the lower income groups in both
educational categories witnessed the largest increases in housing costs-to-income ratios.
4.3 Possible alternative explanations
The increased expenditure shares on housing could arise for reasons other than those sug-
gested by our models. For instance, over the period we examine, house prices increased
sharply and steadily. If households’ expectations about future gains subsequently increased,
then households may increase their demand for housing and increase their share of income
devoted to housing. Another possible reason for increased expenditure shares on housing
could arise from expectations that future income will be higher, leading to increased spending
18on housing and on other goods as well. We investigate each of these possible explanations
in turn.
Although house prices increased signiﬁcantly during our sample period (1997-2005), the
changes were less than uniform across the country. In particular, several locations along
the Atlantic and Paciﬁc coasts witnessed tremendous increases whereas many other areas,
especially in the south, experienced much more muted increases. To illustrate this point,
Figure 4 shows the kernel density of house price appreciation from 2000 to 2005 for the
MSAs in our sample.23 We split the AHS data into four quartiles based on the change in
home prices, and then re-estimate the models for each group.24 The results are presented
in Table 5. As a baseline, column 1 presents the model estimates from the entire sample
and replicates the results in Table 2. The change in expenditure shares varies somewhat
across regions, but not systematically with the degree of local housing market conditions.
However, if expectations for house price appreciation are inﬂuenced not by local conditions
but instead solely by national conditions (which we ﬁnd unlikely), then the results in Table
5 do not rule out the possibility that increased expectations of appreciation could be partly
responsible for increased expenditures shares on housing.
Another possible explanation for our results is that spending shares on all goods may
have increased, perhaps as a reﬂection of increased future income expectations. After all,
the aggregate savings rate fell considerably during our sample period. To examine this hy-
19pothesis, we examined information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). Relative
to the AHS, the CES does not contain geographical information or detailed information on
costs associated with the servicing of property debt. However, an advantage of the CES
is that it does contain information on expenditures other than housing costs. We compute
several expenditure share measures using these data from 1994 to 2003 and run regressions
similar to those using the AHS data. The results are presented in Table 6. In the ﬁrst column
we show results from a regression of spending relative to income that excludes housing on a
set of year dummies and demographic characteristics for households that are homeowners.
Between 1994 and 2003, there appears to be a slight decrease in the share of income devoted
to non-housing consumption. The second column shows the same basic regression but where
the dependent variable is the share of income going to mortgage payments. Roughly speak-
ing, the decrease in the share of income going to other consumption goods is matched by
the increase in income going to housing. This result is interesting in that it suggests that
the increase in expenditures for housing did not come directly out of saving but instead out
of consumption of other goods.25
4.4 Mortgage and demographic characteristics
The empirical sections above examined homeownership and the share of income devoted to
housing of homeowners. In this section, we examine the choice of mortgage characteris-
20tics. Recall that according to our model, younger, cash-constrained households with steep
expected income proﬁles would stand to beneﬁt from mortgages with low initial payments.
One way households can reduce their mortgage payments, at least for a time, is to ﬁnance
their housing consumption with mortgage products that have relatively low introductory
interest rates.
The AHS data contain limited information about the primary mortgage of homeowners,
including the interest rates for the primary and secondary mortgages. Using this information,
we construct an average mortgage interest rate where the interest rates are weighted by
the value of the mortgage. We then examine the relationship between interest rates and
demographic characteristics, and those results are presented in Table 7. Before discussing the
results, an important omitted variable in our models is credit quality. Given the importance
of this variable, the results in Table 7 have to be viewed with greater skepticism than the
results in the previous tables. With that caveat in mind, the results in Table 7 are entirely
consistent with our models.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 7 are probit models where the dependent variable equals
one if the average interest rate is in the lowest quintile for a year. The ﬁrst column shows
the results for the entire sample and the second and third columns estimate the models
separately by whether households are in the bottom or top half of the income distribution.
In addition to the controls used in Tables 2-6, the controls in Table 7 also include dummy
21variables for the income decile of the household; it is hoped that these controls may be
correlated with the unobserved credit quality of households.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 7 show that households headed by individuals with
at least some college education are more likely to be in the lowest interest rate quintile.
However, this result may be tainted from a positive correlation between education and credit
quality that is not captured by the income deciles. The remaining rows of the table show the
coeﬃcients for the age dummies; in all three columns, younger households are more likely
to have lower interest rates on their mortgages. This result is somewhat surprising as credit
quality is likely to be inversely related to age. Comparing columns 2 and 3, we ﬁnd that the
age proﬁle of interest rates is greater for lower income households than for higher income
households. Again, lower income households are more likely to face the constraints addressed
in our model, and therefore may be more inclined to choose mortgage instruments that oﬀer
initially low interest rates. We also estimated models where the dependent variable is the
average interest rate; those models yield results that are qualitatively very similar to the
probit results.26
5 Conclusion
Over the last decade there have been several innovations in mortgage markets, such as the
lowering of down payment requirements, the increased ﬂexibility in repayment schedules,
22and the reduction of costs associated with extracting equity from homes. We develop a
model that generates testable implications of how these innovations would aﬀect household
behavior. For instance, the lowering of down payment requirements should result in home-
ownership increasing, especially for young people who are traditionally cash constrained. In
fact, we show that between 1994 and 2004, the homeownership rate for young people rose
sharply. Our model predicts that lower down payments and more ﬂexible mortgage payment
schedules should lead to higher housing consumption for previously constrained households.
Empirically we document that households have increased the share of their income devoted
to housing by a substantial margin. The result is robust to the changing composition of
households and also to location; the share of income devoted to housing costs has increased
signiﬁcantly in markets, regardless of what happened to housing prices in those markets.
Finally, we ﬁnd that young educated households have dramatically increased their housing
expenditures between 1995 and 2005, but appear to be ﬁnancing these expenditures with
mortgages that have relatively low interest rates. We interpret this ﬁnding to be suggestive
that these households may be ﬁnancing their increased housing consumption with alterna-
tive, ﬂexible mortgage products.
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25Notes
1 See Green and Wachter (2005) and Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2006) for longer-term
historical descriptions of changes in the mortgage market and see LaCour-Little (2000) for
a discussion of more recent changes.
2 Bostic and Surette (2001) document the narrowing of the homeownership gap between
whites and minorities over the past several decades, attributing a large part to mortgage
market innovations such as credit scoring. Li (2005) notes that in addition to the increase in
homeownership rates in the 1990’s, leverage (the loan-to-value ratio) conditional on home-
ownership has also increased. See also Davidoﬀ (2006) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2005).
3 See Hochstein 2000.
4 See Doms and Krainer (2007) for a fuller description of these measures.
5 See Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (2001) for evidence of structural change in the
propensity to reﬁnance.
6 See LaCour-Little (2000) for an excellent summary of the role of technology in mortgage
ﬁnance.
7 See Barakova, Bostic, Calem, and Wachter (2003).
8 Vickery (2006) documents that the choice between ﬁxed-rate and adjustable-rate mort-
gage loans is very sensitive to the level of interest rates. Koijen, van Hemert, and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2006) show that the variation in the total share of adjustable-rate mortgages
over time is linked to the bond risk premium embedded in mortgage interest rates.
9 See, for example, LeRoy (1996) and Stanton and Wallace (1998).
2610 While demand for alternative mortgage products surged in the early 2000s, these prod-
ucts could not be considered new at the time. For example, the graduated payment mortgage
was ﬁrst oﬀered in 1977. See Alm and Follain (1984) for an analysis of the possible consumer
gains to using this and other ﬂexible mortgage products. Campbell (2006) notes that, his-
torically, consumers have been slow to demand ﬁnancial products that would seemingly be
welfare enhancing. See Krainer (2006) for further discussion on the prevalence of alternative
mortgages.
11 The down payment and income constraints arise, in part, because of information asym-
metries between borrowers and lenders. The down payment constraint guards against moral
hazard that might lead borrowers to default on their loans. The payment-to-income con-
straints can be justiﬁed by the notion that lenders might not know what a borrower’s true
income growth prospects are.
12 The results in Figure 1 hold using other datasets as well.
13 Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2007) have explored this idea, arguing that innovations
in mortgage markets may have helped households to better smooth nonhousing consumption.
Hurst and Staﬀord (2004) examine the propensity to reﬁnance for liquidity-constrained and
non liquidity-constrained households.
14 Housing services, the variable in the consumer’s model, is diﬃcult to measure. We as-
sume that most households that became homeowners increased their ﬂow of housing services
from when they rented.
15 For more comprehensive discussions on the increase in the homeownership rate, see
Bostic and Surrette (2000), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2005), and Li (2005).
16 We examined primary mortgage cost to abstract away from a change in debt structure
27of households, such as a shift away from revolving credit to a home equity line of credit or
a second mortgage.
17 Households headed by individuals 70 years old or older are excluded. The results in
this paper are robust to a wide array of other measures of demographics.
18 The results are robust to choice of the right-censoring value.
19 Our results are robust to a other speciﬁcations that control for new homeowners.
20 The general result that the share of income devoted to housing has increased is consistent
with results using other data sets, including the Survey of Consumer Finances, the Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics, and the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
21 One of the implications of the model is that the share of income devoted to housing
would become more constant over time. However, discerning whether a ﬂattening of the
age-housing cost proﬁle has occurred is diﬃcult using a data set that spans only 8 years.
To make more deﬁnitive statements whether housing costs-age proﬁles have changed shape,
data for a suﬃcient period of time after the changes in mortgage markets have taken place
would be required. The results presented here are limited to suggesting that more is being
spent on housing for all age groups.
22 The sample sizes in Table 3 are skewed to the higher income quintiles because the
income quintiles are computed using the entire AHS sample, which includes renters. Renters
tend to have lower incomes than homeowners. The results are robust to income quintiles
being computed using only homeowners.
23 We examined the price change for a number of diﬀerent periods, and our results are
robust to the time period examined.
2824 Several of the models run in Table 2 control for MSA in that a dummy variable is
used for all time periods. This dummy variable will pick up mean diﬀerences in housing
expenditures-to-income by region but will not capture changes in housing expenditures-to-
income by region.
25 There are several reasons why our results can be consistent with the decline in the
national savings rate. First, the regressions in Table 6 represent the mean household whereas
the national savings rate, in essence, weights households by income. As we saw previously,
higher income households did not increase their housing expenditures as a share of income
by as much as lower income households. Further, the decrease in the oﬃcial national savings
rate stems, in part, from an increase in health care expenditures. In the oﬃcial statistics,
employer contributions also go towards consumption, which reduces the savings rate.
26 We also examined other observable characteristics of the mortgage, such as whether the
mortgage is adjustable or not. Unfortunately, the AHS data do not provide other information
on how and when the interest rate is adjustable. For instance, a traditional 10-1 ARM would
be coded the same as a 1-year ARM that oﬀered a low initial teaser rate.
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Figure 3: Kernel Densities of Total Housing Costs as a Percent
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Figure 4:  Kernel Density of House Price Changes Across MSAs
 Change
1994 2004 2004-1994
Age of head of household
18-29 26.6 33.2 6.6
30-39 55.8 61.8 6.0
40-49 70.5 74.1 3.6
50-59 77.8 79.6 1.8
60+ 77.9 81.4 3.5
Education (in years of schooling) of head of household
12 years or less 61.3 64.1 2.8
13 or more  66.6 72.9 6.3
Age and education of head of household
18-29 12 years or less 25.4 30.0 4.6
13 or more  27.7 35.6 7.9
30-39 12 years or less 50.2 52.0 1.8
13 or more  60.4 67.9 7.5
40-49 12 years or less 63.6 66.1 2.5
13 or more  75.8 79.6 3.8
50-59 12 years or less 73.4 73.2 -0.2
13 or more  82.5 83.7 1.2
60+ 12 years or less 75.3 78.2 2.9
13 or more  83.4 86.0 2.6
Income quartile of family income
1st quartile 41.2 44.7 3.5
2nd quartile 58.6 63.8 5.2
3rd quartile 72.9 78.5 5.6
4th quartile 87.1 91.1 4.0
Source:  Current Population Survey and authors' calculations
     Rates by year
Table 1:   Homeownership Rates by Demographic Groups, 1994 to 2004Year dummies (1997 omitted) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1999 -0.211 -0.253 -0.255 -0.239 0.052
(0.176) (0.173) (0.171) (0.170) (0.273)
2001 0.885 0.863 0.886 0.863 0.713
(0.173)** (0.170)** (0.169)** (0.168)** (0.270)**
2003 1.093 1.184 1.206 1.262 1.647
(0.172)** (0.169)** (0.168)** (0.167)** (0.269)**
2005 2.632 2.702 2.714 2.860 3.263
(0.172)** (0.170)** (0.169)** (0.167)** (0.272)**
Demographic Controls
Education of head of household 
(=1 if some college or more, =0 
otherwise) -1.653 -1.987 -2.116 -4.190
(0.113)** (0.112)** (0.113)** (0.192)**
Age of head of household 
dummies (less than 30 omitted):
30<=Age<=39 -2.076 -1.067 -2.322 -2.872
(0.223)** (0.225)** (0.220)** (0.362)**
40<=Age<=49 -2.966 -0.542 -3.203 -3.856
(0.215)** (0.223)* (0.213)** (0.354)**
50<=Age<=59 -3.770 -0.428 -4.017 -4.444
(0.226)** (0.242)+ (0.224)** (0.366)**
60<=Age<=69 -5.630 -1.611 -5.753 -7.184
(0.341)** (0.354)** (0.337)** (0.526)**
Number of children 1.262 1.226 1.244 1.396
(0.054)** (0.054)** (0.053)** (0.085)**
Number of prime age adults -3.350 -3.066 -3.581 -3.326
(0.081)** (0.080)** (0.080)** (0.118)**
Number of elderly adults -1.534 -1.356 -1.997 -1.492
(0.187)** (0.185)** (0.185)** (0.273)**
Years living in the house -0.405
(0.045)**
Years living in the house, squared -0.002
(0.003)




Constant 20.156 31.067 32.112 34.714 35.482
(0.120)** (0.324)** (0.326)** (3.873)** (5.990)**
Observations 72443 72443 72443 72443 31020
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 2:  Tobit Models of Total Housing Costs as a Percent of Income 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, all models estimated by maximum likelihood.  All data from the 
American Housing Survey.All
Year dummies (1997 omitted) observations 1 2 3 4 5
1999 -0.253 -1.128 -0.181 0.510 0.020 -0.985
(0.173) (1.001) (0.441) (0.298)+ (0.218) (0.183)**
2001 0.863 1.970 1.527 1.239 1.071 -1.295
(0.170)** (0.970)* (0.439)** (0.293)** (0.217)** (0.180)**
2003 1.184 1.425 1.402 1.314 1.321 -0.247
(0.169)** (0.972) (0.433)** (0.291)** (0.215)** (0.179)
2005 2.702 3.910 3.801 2.709 2.453 1.455
(0.170)** (0.998)** (0.430)** (0.295)** (0.215)** (0.178)**
Education of head of 
household (=1 if some college 
or more, =0 otherwise) -1.653 7.903 3.915 3.246 2.310 1.983
(0.113)** (0.652)** (0.281)** (0.192)** (0.151)** (0.154)**
Age of head of household 
dummies (less than 30 
omitted)
30<=Age<=39 -2.076 2.751 0.003 0.906 0.348 0.088
(0.223)** (1.159)* (0.483) (0.341)** (0.287) (0.331)
40<=Age<=49 -2.966 3.065 -0.809 0.228 -0.431 -1.126
(0.215)** (1.114)** (0.478)+ (0.333) (0.281) (0.323)**
50<=Age<=59 -3.770 0.369 -2.112 -1.678 -2.078 -2.298
(0.226)** (1.155) (0.504)** (0.353)** (0.293)** (0.325)**
60<=Age<=69 -5.630 -1.358 -5.579 -3.829 -4.353 -5.339
(0.341)** (1.639) (0.771)** (0.568)** (0.458)** (0.434)**
Number of children 1.262 2.495 1.525 0.991 0.959 0.802
(0.054)** (0.314)** (0.134)** (0.092)** (0.069)** (0.058)**
Number of prime age adults -3.350 2.287 0.174 -0.349 -0.545 -0.061
(0.081)** (0.480)** (0.219) (0.148)* (0.111)** (0.084)
Number of elderly adults -1.534 4.100 0.714 -0.050 0.003 0.694
(0.187)** (0.987)** (0.443) (0.325) (0.243) (0.198)**
Constant 31.067 21.089 18.192 14.746 14.025 11.359
(0.324)** (1.684)** (0.785)** (0.565)** (0.470)** (0.480)**
Observations 72438 7537 11637 15254 18212 19798
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, all models estimated by maximum likelihood.  All data from the American Housing Survey.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Income quintile (1=lowest, 5=highest) 
Table 3:  Tobit Models of Total Housing Costs as a Percent of Income by Income 
Quintile(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year dummies (1997 omitted) All Age<=39 40<=Age<=49 Age>=50 Age<=39 40<=Age<=49 Age>=50
1999 -0.253 -0.095 -0.322 -0.345 -0.075 -0.518 -0.309
(0.173) (0.571) (0.517) (0.504) (0.339) (0.358) (0.400)
2001 0.863 2.205 0.527 1.732 0.595 -0.248 0.921
(0.170)** (0.574)** (0.515) (0.500)** (0.335)+ (0.353) (0.388)*
2003 1.184 2.209 1.195 1.014 1.503 0.887 0.692
(0.169)** (0.580)** (0.514)* (0.502)* (0.333)** (0.351)* (0.377)+
2005 2.702 4.224 2.976 2.039 3.300 2.021 2.278
(0.170)** (0.594)** (0.520)** (0.511)** (0.329)** (0.352)** (0.375)**
Education of head of household 
(=1 if some college or more, =0 
otherwise) -1.653
(0.113)**
Age of head of household 









Number of children 1.262 1.447 1.770 2.250 0.968 0.814 1.793
(0.054)** (0.153)** (0.149)** (0.237)** (0.093)** (0.097)** (0.191)**
Number of prime age adults -3.350 -4.324 -3.316 -3.228 -5.255 -3.747 -2.743
(0.081)** (0.361)** (0.228)** (0.206)** (0.222)** (0.166)** (0.146)**
Number of elderly adults -1.534 1.250 3.724 -2.987 1.533 2.667 -2.137
(0.187)** (1.031) (0.816)** (0.285)** (0.663)* (0.587)** (0.218)**
Constant 31.067 28.722 25.828 25.047 29.697 26.368 22.895
(0.324)** (0.785)** (0.584)** (0.566)** (0.456)** (0.419)** (0.421)**
Observations 72438 7737 7746 10456 15645 14711 16143
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
High School or Less Some College or More




Year dummies (1997 omitted)
1999 -0.253 -0.020 1.244 -0.742 -0.448 -0.437
(0.173) (0.501) (0.510)* (0.608) (0.665) (0.215)*
2001 0.863 0.673 1.630 0.579 -0.218 0.894
(0.170)** (0.498) (0.500)** (0.608) (0.646) (0.212)**
2003 1.184 1.639 2.483 0.829 1.020 0.978
(0.169)** (0.493)** (0.500)** (0.604) (0.652) (0.210)**
2005 2.702 3.047 3.576 2.072 3.783 2.554
(0.170)** (0.496)** (0.503)** (0.615)** (0.666)** (0.210)**
Education of head of household 
(=1 if some college or more, =0 
otherwise) -1.653 -2.464 -3.409 -3.959 -6.701 -0.900
(0.113)** (0.338)** (0.362)** (0.428)** (0.461)** (0.139)**
Age of head of household 
dummies (less than 30 omitted)
30<=Age<=39 -2.076 -2.838 -3.513 -2.138 -1.823 -2.000
(0.223)** (0.608)** (0.658)** (0.875)* (0.936)+ (0.274)**
40<=Age<=49 -2.966 -4.234 -4.077 -3.950 -1.768 -2.791
(0.215)** (0.590)** (0.638)** (0.861)** (0.914)+ (0.263)**
50<=Age<=59 -3.770 -4.178 -5.382 -4.621 -1.879 -3.819
(0.226)** (0.620)** (0.665)** (0.877)** (0.940)* (0.279)**
60<=Age<=69 -5.630 -4.664 -8.472 -8.230 -5.665 -4.833
(0.341)** (0.997)** (0.981)** (1.200)** (1.245)** (0.434)**
Number of children 1.262 1.348 1.282 1.228 1.824 1.112
(0.054)** (0.151)** (0.161)** (0.194)** (0.197)** (0.068)**
Number of prime age adults -3.350 -4.081 -3.888 -2.655 -2.327 -3.799
(0.081)** (0.225)** (0.231)** (0.255)** (0.263)** (0.107)**
Number of elderly adults -1.534 -3.121 -1.063 -0.753 -0.399 -2.443
(0.187)** (0.586)** (0.530)* (0.560) (0.594) (0.246)**
Constant 31.067 33.560 36.746 37.514 40.999 29.767
(0.324)** (0.930)** (1.019)** (1.255)** (1.375)** (0.397)**
Observations 72438 7952 8212 6803 6533 42938
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses, all models estimated by maximum likelihood.  All data from the American Housing Survey.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Region (1=lowest house price appreciation, 4=highest 
house price appreciation)
Table 5:  Tobit Models of Total Housing Costs as a Percent of Income by House Price 








Year dummies, 1994 omitted
1997 0.372 1.036 1.278
(1.071) (0.535)+ (0.692)+
1999 -2.289 1.391 0.958
(1.064)* (0.531)** (0.687)
2001 -1.857 1.662 1.378
(1.100)+ (0.552)** (0.714)+
2003 -2.633 2.070 2.158
(1.274)* (0.636)** (0.823)**
Constant 45.212 21.655 34.873
(1.704)** (0.850)** (1.100)**
Demographic controls
1 Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4599 4524 4524
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Tobit Models of Housing Spending as a Percent of 
Income Using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 1994-2003
Spending as a percent of income by spending 
category
1  Demographic controls include number of income earners and children in the household, 
5 age range dummies for the head of household, and 1 dummy variable for the education 

















Head of household has 
some college education 0.023 0.018 0.025 -0.196 -0.251 -0.210
(0.004)** (0.006)** (0.005)** (0.013)** (0.028)** (0.015)**
Age of head of 
household dummies 
(less than 30 omitted)
30<=Age<=39 -0.028 -0.035 -0.019 0.141 0.207 0.103
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)+ (0.022)** (0.046)** (0.027)**
40<=Age<=49 -0.036 -0.040 -0.030 0.215 0.284 0.208
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.021)** (0.045)** (0.027)**
50<=Age<=59 -0.033 -0.057 -0.017 0.286 0.402 0.234
(0.007)** (0.009)** (0.010)+ (0.023)** (0.049)** (0.028)**
60<=Age<=69 -0.027 -0.051 -0.014 0.290 0.496 0.234
(0.011)* (0.015)** (0.016) (0.038)** (0.082)** (0.044)**
Demographic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 54648 16948 37575 54411 17062 37586
R-squared 0.28 0.16 0.33
Standard errors in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Demographic controls include the same variable reported in tables 2-6, dummy variables for income decile, and dummy 
variables for SMSA.
Expected change in probability from a 
probit model of a household being in the 
bottom quintile of interest rates
OLS coefficients of the interest rate on the 
primary and second mortgages
Table 7:  Interest Rates on Mortgages and Demographic Characteristics